Abstract
I. Introduction
The share of total foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to less developed countries (LDCs) as a share of total world FDI has increased from 25% in the 1990s to 31% in the 2000s. 1 These inflows have been encouraged and welcomed by LDCs because of the important role they play in domestic economies as a source of growth and job creation.
However, there are concerns that LDCs could competitively undercut each other's environmental regulations to attract FDI (Elliot and Shimamoto, 2008) . This "race to the bottom" in LDCs may result in these countries becoming "pollution havens", where multinational corporations (MNCs) locate operations in order to save on environmental related costs. In this scenario, the MNCs that have more to gain from relocating are those in the most polluting intensive or "dirty" industries. Therefore, as LDCs continue to attract significant shares of FDI flows, it is important to assess whether FDI inflows to LDCs are associated with higher levels of pollution.
In this study, we analyse the link between FDI and CO 2 emissions in Latin America from 1980 to 2007. In particular, we conduct a panel Granger causality test of the relationship between FDI and CO 2 emissions. This approach allows us to address two important issues. First, it helps us to obtain more reliable estimates on the relationship between FDI and CO 2 emissions by addressing causality in the relationship. Second, since we are working with macro data, a panel approach allows us to increase the number of observations significantly and to draw conclusions that are region specific. In addition, our analysis expands on previous work by using FDI data disaggregated by sectors.
Therefore, we are able to explore whether increases on FDI in pollution intensive sectors are associated with higher CO 2 emissions in Latin America.
Latin America is an interesting case study for exploring the relation between FDI and CO 2 emissions. This region receives the most capital inflows to LDCs after Asia, with a share of total FDI inflows around 30% (UNCTAD, 2010) . In addition, as developing countries continue to grow, their CO 2 emissions have become an important issue in international agreements related to trade and the environment.
The results of our study indicate that FDI inflows in the pollution intensive sectors can be linked to increases in CO 2 emissions, but the same relationship does not hold for FDI in other sectors. Hence, policy makers in the region could benefit from considering this differentiated environmental impact of FDI.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section II, we discuss the relationship between FDI and pollution with a review of the current literature. Section III provides a theoretical framework. Section IV describes the data used in the analysis, while section V covers the methodology. The discussion of the results with robustness tests is included in Section VI, and Section VII concludes.
II. FDI and the Environment: A Review of the Literature
There is considerable literature studying FDI flows into LDCs. This interest is due, to some degree, to the significant increases of FDI inflows to LDCs over the last decade.
Moreover, FDI has attracted attention as a potential engine to economic growth in emerging economies. The benefits of FDI on growth stem from its long-term nature, the creation of capital stock and employment and the transfer of skills and technology that lead to greater productivity (Borensztein, et al., 1999 . This is known as the "pollution haven" hypothesis (Grossman and Krueger, 1991; Mani and Wheeler, 1998) . The empirical evidence has been mixed, with various studies finding no support for the pollution haven hypothesis (Mani and Wheeler, 1998; Eskeland and Harrison, 2003; MacDermott, 2009 and Wagner and Timmins, 2009 ).
The lack of consistent evidence in favor the pollution haven hypothesis may suggest that environmental regulations are unlikely to have an effect on plant location since the MNCs savings from lower environmental regulation could be small. Moreover, it is possible that pollution intensive industries relocating to LDCs can have cleaner production methods than similar domestic industries (see Grossman and Krueger, 1991) .
According to this view, FDI to LDCs may bring cleaner technologies in the long run.
Likewise, it is expected that domestic firms will eventually acquire the cleaner technologies of foreign firms. This view is known as the "pollution halo" hypothesis and supports the notion that the presence of foreign-owned firms may yield substantial environmental benefits to LDCs (Grossman and Krueger, 1991; Zarsky, 1999; Antweiler, et al., 2001; Birdsall and Wheeler, 2001; Talukdar and Meisner, 2001) . In general, the empirical evidence on the link between FDI and pollution has been ambiguous and concrete policy recommendations are difficult to make.
A possible explanation of the ambiguity in the empirical results across studies lies in the differences in the scope (or question) and the empirical approach (including differences in econometric methodologies, lack of comparable data, and proxies). The empirical approach to study the relationship between FDI and the environment can be seen from two perspectives. One approach relates to the studies that attempt to assess if firms choose to locate in countries with low environmental standards by using industry level data, measures of environmental stringency and pollution intensities by industries (using pollution abatement expenditures either at home and/or abroad). The majority of this work is composed of case studies or firm level analysis. A source of concern with this approach is that it is difficult to measure and to account for environmental stringency (Eskeland and Harrison, 2003; Albornoz, et al., 2009; Wagner and Timmins, 2009) .
A second approach in the literature has concentrated on the impact of FDI on the environment. That is, once firms are located in other countries it is expected that the pollution levels will increase. In this context, it is argued that pollution levels could also work as a proxy of environmental stringency. Studying the empirical link between FDI and pollution is still a difficult task. Available data on country level FDI for developing countries tends to be at the aggregate level while FDI as a cause of pollution might be more related to certain types of industries. Moreover, pollution data by industry seldom exists for these types of countries.
An additional limitation of both approaches is that most of the existing analyses do not study the causality between FDI, environmental policy and pollution. Causality is important since it is possible that MNCs relocate to countries which already have high pollution concentrations. Conversely, MNCs may relocate to LDCs, and this will lead to an increase in pollutants concentrations. Moreover, these two situations are not mutually exclusive. In the literature, the most common approach assumes environmental regulation (or pollution) as a function of FDI or vice-versa. Since the impact of FDI on pollution may go both ways, the empirical methodology should take into account this bidirectionality. Only few studies have addressed this type of problem by conducting a causality or cointegration analysis (see Hoffmann, et al., 2005; Merican, et al., 2007; Acharyya, 2009; Lee, 2009 ). These studies have found that, in most instances, FDI can clearly be linked to pollution or environmental damage. In the next section we discuss the current literature and some of the trends of FDI and pollution in the case of Latin America.
FDI and the Environment in Latin America
The (Marland, et al., 2008) . There is a scant literature on the relationship between FDI and pollution for the case of Latin America. Most of these studies are limited by the scope of the data used and, in most cases, they rely on a small sample period or a small number of observations.
Moreover, most of the research for the region is country specific, and very few empirical studies have considered the region as a whole. In general, the overall evidence on the relationship between FDI and emissions is, at best, mixed.
Some studies, such as Cole and Ensign (2005) , MacDermott (2006), Barbier and Hultberg (2007) , and Waldkirch and Gopinath (2008) Birdsall, et al., (2001) find support for the "pollution halo" hypothesis in the case of Chile.
Our paper contributes to the above literature by looking at the causal relationships between FDI and the CO 2 emissions. We take a panel approach, which increases the number of observations significantly and allows us to draw conclusions that are region specific. In addition, our analysis expands on previous work by using FDI data disaggregated by sectors. We explore whether FDI in certain sectors is associated with greater emissions in Latin America. Moreover, our methodology differs from previous analyses as we incorporate time series econometric techniques that provide more reliable estimates on the relationship between FDI and pollution. Next, we describe the theoretical framework, the data used in our analysis and the econometric methodology.
III. Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework loosely follows Baumol and Oates (1988) and List and Co (2000) . Since pollutant emissions are generated during production, we can consider without loss of generality that these emissions are inputs to the production process.
Hence, the profits of a plant in region j are given by the following equation:
( 1) where G is the vector of inputs and other characteristics which include labor, capital, distance to the markets, export and import taxes. Z is the amount of emissions used in production and is the unit price of emissions. Setting , where the superscript asterisk indicates the profit maximizing choice, the profits of the firm can be expressed as follows: (2) Equation (2) shows profits as a function of the input intensities and their prices. In the absence of any environmental regulation, the private marginal cost of emissions is zero (that is ). will increase with higher or more stringent environmental regulation. Thus, the degree that environmental regulation (as reflected in ) can affect the firm's profits depends on the pollution intensity of production. The profits of firms with high will be more sensitive to changes in . Therefore in our analysis we concentrate on whether FDI in industries with high pollution intensities has a differential effect on pollution.
Thus, other things equal a firm will relocate to the region where is the lowest.
However, in many cases a new location implies also a new set of prices associated with different cost of labor, energy transportation, and imports and exports tariffs. It is likely that once a plant faces different prices, the input intensities will also change.
This implies that FDI will flow from a region with strong to non-existent (or weak) environmental regulations if the following condition is satisfied:
where the subscript s denotes if the region enforces environmental regulations and w is the region without environmental regulations. To simplify Equation (3) we can assume that in the region with weak environmental regulation. Under the condition shown in Equation (3), the region with low environmental restrictions will receive FDI from high pollution intensity industries. However, notice that, as mentioned before, other inputs and characteristics in G can affect the location decision of the plant.
The location decision of the firm will depend on the actual values of the parameters in Equation (3) which requires estimating these values. Since it is difficult to compile firm level data consistent throughout the region to estimate the profit function for each plant, we look at FDI inflows to Latin American countries and sorted by different sectors in order to assess their effect on CO 2 emissions. That is, if the condition above holds then we would expect to observe that pollution intensive industries would relocate to countries with lax environmental regulation, leading to higher emissions in these countries.
IV. Data
Our pollution measure is the growth in CO 2 emissions per capita. CO 2 is a pollutant commonly used in the literature because of its contribution to global warming, and it is generally involved as a main variable of concern in international agreements (Smarzynska and Wei, 2001; Talukdar and Meisner, 2001; Hoffmann, et al., 2005; MacDermott, 2006; Merican, et al., 2007; Acharyya, 2009; MacDermott, 2009 ).
Furthermore, CO 2 emissions are the only indicator related to the environment that is available consistently over time for Latin American countries.
Previous work has used CO 2 emissions growth (Hoffmann, et al., 2005) , total CO 2 emissions (Acharyya, 2009) , CO 2 emissions to GDP ratio (MacDermott, 2009) and CO 2 emissions per capita in levels (Talukdar and Meisner, 2001; MacDermott, 2006) . Few other papers have used other pollution measures such as SO 2 , NOx and PT (see Xing and Kolstad, 2002; MacDermott, 2006; and Waldkirch and Gopinat, 2008) . We place emphasis on the growth of CO 2 emissions per capita since total emissions can be associated with population growth (see MacDermott, 2006) . We construct the growth of CO 2 emissions per capita as the first difference of the natural log of CO 2 emissions per capita. For the purpose of robustness, we use an alternative indicator of pollution. We use the growth of the CO 2 emissions to GDP ratio at 2005 constant international dollars (using purchasing power parity rates; where growth is constructed as the difference of the natural log). Both indicators of CO 2 emissions were obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI, 2010).
Regarding FDI, we expand the literature by considering FDI inflows disaggregated by sector. As mentioned in Section III, plants in sectors with higher pollution intensity would be, at least in theory, more likely to be located in regions with weak environmental regulations. Therefore, to determine the type of capital inflows that are more detrimental to the environment we consider the three main different sectors: primary, secondary, and tertiary. We believe that this sectoral disaggregation for Latin America is an important contribution since most of the existing literature uses aggregate measures of FDI.
Roughly speaking, the primary sector includes agricultural and mining activities, the secondary sector manufacturing activities, and the tertiary sector services. Table 1 shows a description of the industries/sectors included in each category. However, some industries within the sectors have vast differences in pollution intensities. Therefore, we consider an additional indicator that aggregates FDI in pollution intensive industries only.
Considering FDI in pollution intensive industries is also a key contribution of this paper.
The methodology to categorise an industry as pollution intensive varies in the literature. For example, Kahn (2003) uses energy use and the toxic inventory, whereas List and Co (2000) considers emissions by industry and pollution abatement operating expenditures. Jaffe et al. (1995) and Levinson (1996) use pollution abatement capital expenditures as a percentage of new or total capital expenditures to compute an indicator of pollution intensity. Table 1 shows the industries that were considered as pollution intensive in some of the previous studies. Despite the differences in the number and detail of sectors, as well as in the methodology to obtain the pollution intensity, there are vast similarities in the industries labeled as pollution intensive. For example, chemicals, petroleum and primary metals are regarded as pollution intensive by most of these studies. Based on this information and the available data on disaggregated FDI, we categorise as pollution intensive: mining, quarrying and petroleum, wood and wood products, paper and paper products, chemicals and chemical products, non-metallic mineral products, metal and metal products, electrical and electronic equipment, and motor vehicles and other transport equipment. Hence, we create a pollution intensive or "dirty" sector comprised of these industries.
We also construct FDI inflows in different sectors (primary, secondary, tertiary, 
V. Methodology
We use a Granger causality test in order to determine the relationship between sectoral FDI inflows and pollution emissions. The Granger causality test is based on the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) framework. Our empirical methodology contributes to the literature in the following two ways. First, our analysis focuses on Latin America and uses sectoral FDI. To our knowledge, there is no other analysis that looks at the region as a whole and uses a data on FDI by sector. We specifically test the impact of FDI inflows in those industries that are considered the most polluting. Second, we expand on previous work by using a Granger causality test in a framework that takes into consideration country characteristics and time specific effects. To check the robustness of our results we: i) extend our analysis to a multivariate VAR, where we control for other variables related to CO 2 emissions and ii) use CO 2 emissions to GDP ratio as an alternative indicator of emissions.
The modeling used for our Granger causality test, which relates to Hoffmann's et al. (2005) analysis, is explained in detail below. The panel VAR framework used in this analysis is specified as follows:
Where y represents the growth of CO 2 emissions per capita and x is the FDI inflows in a specific sector. The subscript i represents the country (i =1, 2, … N) and t represents the time period (t = 1, 2, … T). k represents the number of lags of the variables y and x included as regressors, and a i and τ t represent the country and time fixed effects. It is assumed that x and y are stationary and that the error term in both equations is uncorrelated white noise.
We In this case, rejecting Ho will lead to conclude that CO 2 emissions will cause FDI inflows in a specific sector. Our model is specified in Equations 4 and 5 in a bivariate VAR form, but it can be extended to a multivariate form by expanding the number of regressors.
Since our main focus is on the impact of FDI on CO 2 emissions, we limit our discussion of Granger causality running from FDI to CO 2 emissions. For the multivariate VAR, following Talukdar and Meisner's (2001) approach, we include GDP per capita growth and the growth of manufacturing value added as a share of GDP. Both indicators are likely to be important determinants of pollution and CO 2 levels.
The Granger causality test with fixed effects used in this analysis provides the advantage of accounting for country characteristics and time effects. Including country and time fixed effects in a panel VAR estimation allows us to deal with omitted variable bias, an important aspect when considering causality. 5 In particular, country fixed effects control for characteristics that do not change for a given country, such as the proximity to
the US or other markets. The time effects control for events within a year that are common to all the countries such as regional economic crisis or variations in oil prices.
Furthermore, an important condition for the validity of our analysis is that the variables used in the analysis are stationary. We perform the panel unit root test that assumes individual unit root processes proposed by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) in the following variables: FDI by sector in levels (all in natural logs), CO 2 per capita growth, CO 2 to GDP ratio growth, GDP per capita growth, and manufacturing value added share of GDP growth (for all variables, growth estimated as the first difference of the natural log). We reject the null hypothesis that the series are non-stationary at the 5 percent level for all the variables. The number of lags included in the estimations is selected according to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Table 4 presents the estimates of the Granger causality test with fixed effects specified in the methodology section for the bivariate and multivariate VAR. The Table   presents the F test (along with the probability in parenthesis) and also, in brackets, the table presents the addition of the coefficients of the causally prior lagged regressor in the estimation (independent variable in the estimation). Number of lags and observations are also provided in Table 4 .
VI. Results
In Table 4 , the estimates in column 1 present the Granger causality test when we use total FDI inflows, and columns 2-4 when we use FDI in primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. Estimates in column 5 of We also explore whether our results are robust to using the growth of the ratio of CO 2 emissions to real GDP. This indicator is useful since changes in economic activity can affect CO 2 emissions, and it directly represents the emissions to output intensity of production. Thus, cleaner technologies could be reflected in lower emissions of CO 2 per unit of real GDP. In Table 4 emissions at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. Estimates from the bivariate VAR when we use the growth of the ratio of CO 2 emissions to GDP are shown in columns 5 and 6. These estimates are very similar to those shown in columns 1 and 2 for the bivariate VAR with CO 2 emissions per capita. When using growth of the ratio of CO 2 emissions to GDP, we find that the first lag of FDI in the dirty sector has a significant positive effect on CO 2 emissions at the 10 percent level, while the second and third lag have a significant effect at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively.
It is necessary to discuss the magnitude of the effect that FDI in the dirty sector has on CO 2 emissions. Using the estimates shown in Table 4 for the bivariate VAR (where the growth of CO 2 emissions per capita is the dependent variable and FDI in the dirty sector in the independent variable), we find the following effect for the average country.
An increase on FDI in the dirty sector as share of GDP by one standard deviation increases CO 2 emissions per capita by 0.96 percent in the next two periods after the initial increase on FDI in the dirty sector. An increase on CO 2 emissions per capita of 0.96 percent for the average country represents an increase of 0.03 emissions of CO 2 metric tons per capita. This effect is of significant magnitude considering that for 2007, the emissions of CO 2 ranged between 1 and 2 metric tons per capita for the majority of the countries in the sample (13 out of 18 have a value in this range).
In summary, our analysis shows that there is robust evidence that FDI in the dirty sector Granger causes CO 2 emissions. This suggests that as FDI in the dirty sector increases, CO 2 emissions are likely to increase, even after controlling for country and time specific characteristics. Thus, in line with MacDermott's (2006) analysis for Mexico, our results suggest that there may be a significant negative environmental impact of FDI inflows in dirty sectors for the Latin American region. However, we find no robust effect of FDI in other sectors on CO 2 emissions. Our results at first sight contrast with some of the previous findings by Grossman and Krueger (1991) ; Carrada-Bravo (1995) ; Birdsall, et al. (2001); Albornoz, et al., (2009) . However, these studies did not considered the role of dirty industries separately and the possible endogeneity in the FDIpollution relationship.
VII. Concluding Remarks
FDI to LDCs has increased over the last decades. As a result, academics and policy makers are interested on determining the environmental effects of these flows.
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between FDI and CO 2 concentrations in Latin America from 1980 to 2007 and provide insights on the environmental effect of FDI.
We find evidence that, in the case of some Latin American countries, FDI inflows in pollution intensive industries can be linked to increases in CO 2 emissions per capita and per unit of GDP. Distinguishing the environmental effect of FDI by sectors is relevant for policymakers. It is unlikely that Latin American countries would want to restrict the inflows of FDI in the pollution intensive sectors since this form of investment represents a large share of total FDI. In our sample, about 37 percent of total FDI inflows have, on average, gone to pollution intensive industries.
An important policy implication of our analysis is that FDI in pollution intensive industries should be closely monitored. It is relevant for governments in the region to be aware of the detrimental effects that this form of FDI has on the environment. The creation of a fund for environmental improvement in these countries might be a possible policy action that will ensure better environmental conditions in the region. The size of this fund should be dependent on the amount of FDI in the polluting sectors and estimations of the environmental damage associated with the increase in CO 2 emissions, where the public and private sector can contribute.
While our analysis shows that FDI in pollution intensive sectors causes higher CO 2 emissions in Latin America, we are unable to directly support or reject the pollution haven or pollution halo hypothesis. The lack of readily available firm level data for Latin America does not allow us to empirically test these hypotheses. Holtz et al. (1988) for a discussion on the benefits of using fixed effects in a panel VAR. 6 Other estimations using the growth of the ratio of CO 2 to GDP and FDI in different sectors are not included for purpose of space, but are available upon request FDI total (% GDP)* Log of the total FDI inflows as a share of GDP. Source: Authors' construction using data from UNCTAD/DITE (2010).
FDI primary (% GDP)* Log of the total FDI inflows in primary sector as a share of GDP. For FDI primary we aggregate FDI in the following categories: 1) agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing, and *2) mining, quarrying and petroleum. Source: Authors' construction using data from UNCTAD/DITE (2010).
FDI secondary (% GDP)
Log of the total FDI inflows in secondary sector as a share of GDP. For FDI tertiary we aggregate FDI in the following categories: 1) food, beverages and tobacco, 2) textiles, clothing and leather, *3) wood and wood products, *4) paper and paper products, *5) chemicals and chemical products, 6) rubber and plastic products, *7) non-metallic mineral products, *8) metal and metal products, 9) machinery and equipment, *10) electrical and electronic equipment, and *11) motor vehicles and other transport equipment. Source: Authors' construction using data from UNCTAD/DITE (2010).
FDI tertiary (% GDP)
Log of the total FDI inflows in tertiary sector as a share of GDP. For FDI tertiary we aggregate FDI in the following categories: 1) electricity, gas and water, 2) construction, 3) trade, 4) hotels and restaurants, 5) transport, storage and communications, and 5) finance. Source: Authors' construction using data from UNCTAD/DITE (2010).
FDI dirty (% GDP)
Log of the total FDI inflows in dirty industries as a share of GDP. For FDI dirty we aggregate FDI in the categories denoted above with "*". Source: Authors' construction using data from UNCTAD/DITE (2010).
GDP growth
Log difference of real GDP per capita (constant 2000 US dollars). Source: Authors' construction using World Development Indicators (2010).
Manuf. val. add. growth
Log difference of manufacturing value added as a share of GDP. Source: Authors' construction using World Development Indicators (2010).
FDI aggregation by sector is done adding the available observations with a positive value. Variable is truncated for non-positive values in order to take natural log (a value of 1E-11 is assigned for nonpositive values). Series filled in with linear interpolation for missing observations. <2, 290> <3, 277> <2, 314> <2, 266> <2, 266> F-values with probabilities in parenthesis and the sum of the coefficients of the causally prior lagged regressors in brackets. Lag and observation numbers indicated by <lag, obs>. Granger causality test estimated with country-time fixed effects and one FDI indicator at the time (in logs). We use the growth of CO 2 per capita for estimations in columns 1 through 5, while column 6 we use the growth of CO 2 as a share of real GDP. 
